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INTRODUCTION
.The Federal Rules of Evidence (the "Federal Rules") are the product
of careful, painstaking work. The core rules were all drafted simultane-
ously by one body, the Advisory Committee. The drafters, distinguished
members of the Advisory Committee, produced rules that are relatively
clear and consistent, with only occasional quirks.' While there have been
* James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of Law. I would
like to thank Professors Ronald J. Allen, Dale Nance, Aviva Orenstein, and the other
participants in the Conference on the Foundations of the Law of Evidence and their
Implications for Developing Countries held in Chicago, Illinois on November 21 and
22, 2014. 1 would also like to thank Andrew Demirchyan for able research assistance.
1 For a brief description of the background of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1-4 (7th ed.
1998). The most notorious idiosyncrasy was the classification of admissions as "not
hearsay." Seeking to make a point about the purpose of hearsay exceptions, the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence decided to place certain statements that
were offered for their truth in a supplemental category of statements that were "not
hearsay" instead of classifying them as hearsay falling under an exception. For
criticism of this quirk, see Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)'s Oxymoronic 'Not Hearsay'
Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTs. L.
REV. 1 (2011).
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subsequent changes, the basic text and structure have remained the same.
A multi-year restyling project improved the clarity of the rules, and the
restyled rules became effective in 2011.2 The sole purpose of the project
was to make the rules easier to understand without changing their sub-
stance.' The drafters in the restyling project were advised and influenced
by experts on "plain language" drafting.4 The plain language of the
restyled rules produced a model for evidentiary rules that is generally
considered superior to its original version.5 Despite the care and consis-
tency that went into the plain language restyling project, there are rea-
sons to hesitate before adopting the Federal Rules as a model for hearsay
evidence. The primary reason is that the federal ban on hearsay was
designed for use in a broader procedural system whose features deter-
mine what types of hearsay evidence are allowed.6
This Article consists of four Parts. Part I explains the institutional con-
text of the hearsay rule in the United States. Part II analyzes the ratio-
nale for dispensing with the hearsay rule in systems with no jury trials.
Part III considers the hearsay rule in the proposed Tanzania Evidence
Act ("Proposed TEA").7 Finally, Part IV adds additional comments
based on the assumption that Tanzania decides to use the Federal Rules
model despite the fact that Tanzania does not have a jury trial system. It
argues that the original version of the hearsay provisions of the Federal
Rules would be a better model than the version that emerged from
Congress.
2 The restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence was preceded by a restyling of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Robert L. Hinkle, Questions and Answers:
The Hon. Robert L. Hinkle Discusses Recently Restyled Federal Rules of Evidence, 9
FED. EVIDENCE REV. 225, 229 (2012).
3 Id.
I There was opposition to this revision from those who thought it was not worth
the trouble and that familiar language should be retained. For more on the restyling
project, see id. An example of the care used by the restylers was the standardization
of terms mandating action-for example, replacing the term "shall" with more precise
terms. Id. For elaboration by one of the plain language scholars who advised the
restyling projects, see Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 61 (1992).
5 See generally Hinkle, supra note 2.
6 Id.
I Proposed Final Draft: Tanzania Evidence Act 2014 (2014) [hereinafter Proposed
Tanzania Evidence Act], available at http://www.bu.edu/ilj/reforming-the-law-of-evi
dence-of-tanzania-part-three.
EXPORTING THE HEARSAY PROVISIONS
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN HEARSAY RULE
Several features of the American system increase the need for rules
limiting the admission of hearsay evidence.8 First, the American system
is adversarial-some would say hyper-adversarial.9 The fact that lawyers
define the issues, choose the evidence to be presented, and play the domi-
nant role in preparing and examining witnesses creates a need for rules
that prevent substituting live testimony for hearsay evidence in order to
gain a strategic advantage.1°
Second, the trial by jury is still an option in most federal cases, and the
hearsay rule is linked to the institution of jury trials.11 Commentators
have often argued that the ban on hearsay makes no sense in the absence
of a jury because juries are more susceptible to the prejudicial effects of
hearsay evidence."l In the United States, the hearsay ban is often loos-
ened when adjudicators sit without a jury, for example, in administrative
law adjudications, in arbitration, or in courts of limited jurisdiction.13
Many commentators are skeptical about the effect of the rule against
hearsay in non-jury trials for the following reasons. First, the judges that
preside over bench trials are exposed to the hearsay evidence during the
evidentiary screening process. Second, appellate courts generally defer in
8 For thoughtful commentary on the effect of the adversarial system on evidence
law, bifurcation, jury trial, and concentration of proceedings, see MIRJAN R.
DAMA9KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).
9 See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 425 (1992).
10 This might occur when the lawyer who benefits from a witness's statements
prefers that the witness not be cross-examined, and the other lawyer is afraid to call
the witness for cross-examination because doing so might just elicit testimony
favorable to the other side. Or the party might prefer a hearsay witness to tell
another's story because of the other witness's greater credibility. The prospect that a
court could reject such a witness provides an incentive to seek out the declarant. See
DAMA9KA, supra note 8, at 85. Party control also makes it easier for lawyers to object
to evidence because in a lawyer-dominant system, the objection is not seen as a
criticism of the court's evidence-gathering choices.
11 See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 102 (3d ed. 2013) (estimating that about half of all
federal civil actions that go to trial are tried to a jury).
12 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362,
1365 (1970); see also Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-dependence of
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2006) (generally supporting the proposition
that hearsay is not necessary in the absence of a jury).
13 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency
Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); see also Bennett v. Nat'l Transp. Safety
Bd., 66 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995). Agencies that allow free use of hearsay
sometimes prohibit using it as the sole basis for decision making. See Elliot B.
Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find Administrative Law Application,
78 NEB. L. REV. 135, 139-40 (1999).
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great measure to judges' decisions on the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence in bench trials.' 4 In common-law jurisdictions outside the United
States, the decline in jury trials has been accompanied by the abolition or
diminution of rules that exclude hearsay.15 Part II of this Article will
explain in more detail the importance of limiting the admissibility of
hearsay in jury trials.
Despite the expansion of discovery and other pretrial proceedings,
American trials are generally uninterrupted-once the trial begins,
judges prefer proceeding though the trial without long adjournments.1
6
As a result, when one party introduces new evidence of which the oppos-
ing party is unaware-an inevitable occurrence as new evidence comes to
light-the opposing party has little time to verify this evidence. In juris-
dictions that are more willing to grant adjournments to verify newly intro-
duced evidence, there is less of a need for a rule against hearsay.
17
In the American system, appellate review is primarily designed to cor-
rect errors of law, not to correct mistakes in factfinding.18 Appellate
courts defer to the trial judges and juries' findings of fact, assuming the
truth of testimony that favors the prevailing party before determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.' 9 Moreover,
juries are not required to explain the reasoning behind their factual con-
clusions, thus depriving the appellate court of the opportunity to critique
factfinders' reasoning.2" Overreliance on hearsay is not normally a
ground for reversal under American law, so long as the hearsay evidence
was admissible under the particular jurisdiction's rules of evidence.21 If
14 Commentators have often noted that American judges do not strictly apply the
hearsay rule in non-jury trials. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 12, at 177 ("[I]t is
ubiquitous that judges, magistrates, arbitrators, masters, and diverse other
adjudicators, when sitting without a jury, will typically ... allow hearsay evidence to
be offered, announcing that such evidence will be given exactly the weight its intrinsic
probative value deserves .... ).
15 See Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38, § 1 (U.K.) (abolishing the hearsay rule in
civil cases); Civil Evidence Act, 1988, c. 32, § 1 (Scot.) (abolishing the hearsay rule in
civil cases); Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 §§ 63, 65 (Austl.) (broad exception).
For an account of other liberalizations of the hearsay rule in common law
jurisdictions, see David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(2009).
16 See DAMA9KA, supra note 8.
17 See id. at 58-73.
'8 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (factual findings of a trial judge must be
respected unless "'clearly erroneous"); Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564,
573-74 (1985); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority
Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993-98 (1986).
19 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 11.
20 See Louis, supra note 18, at 993-98.
21 See id.
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U.S. appellate courts were to review factfinding in trial courts more com-
prehensively, mistakes as a result of reliance on weak evidence could be
corrected on appellate review, thus lessening the need for a categorical
ban on hearsay evidence.22
The rule against hearsay in the Federal Rules is mitigated by procedu-
ral doctrines. 23 These doctrines insulate judges from reversals that might
otherwise occur when judges admit or exclude hearsay. Thus, as a practi-
cal matter, judges may admit more hearsay evidence than the Federal
Rules allow. 4 In bench trials, an erroneous decision to admit hearsay
will not automatically lead to reversal on appeal if other evidence sup-
ported the verdict, provided that the trial judge did not affirmatively rely
on the inadmissible hearsay as the sole basis for his or her decision.25
Even in jury trials, the harmless error doctrine often prevents reversal
22 The combined absence of a jury and presence of appellate review of factual
findings is a reason why the hearsay rule and similar exclusionary rules are usually not
applied in American administrative law proceedings. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
19 (1987) (citations omitted) ("In a jury trial, there is little choice but to ask trial
judges to resolve close evidentiary disputes through application of complicated and
detailed exclusionary rules, and thereby to take the risk of a new trial or of a decision
that is not based on all reliable evidence. In Dean Calabresi's words, juries are
"irresponsible" decisionmakers in the sense that they are not required to explain the
bases for their decisions, including particularly the evidentiary bases for their findings
of fact. Thus, if we want to preclude juries from basing findings on evidence
considered unreliable by judges, we can do so only by precluding their exposure to
that evidence in the first place. The considerations are entirely different in agency
adjudications. Agencies and ALJs are required to state the bases for their findings of
fact. Their findings are then subject to judicial review under the substantial evidence
standard. If an agency finding is based on unreliable evidence, the agency's action is
reversed. Thus, there is a mechanism available in agency adjudications independent of
rulings on the admissibility of evidence to insure that agency findings are based only
on reliable evidence.").
23 See Louis, supra note 18, at 1042.
24 See id.
25 As one prominent treatise notes, "[T]he appellate courts indulge the gracious
presumption that the trial judge relied only on the evidence that was properly
admitted in making findings." WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 11, § 102 (citing Plummer
v. W. Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981)).
In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to commit
reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not.
An appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the
admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is
insufficient to support the judgment or unless it affirmatively appears that the
incompetent evidence induced the court to make an affirmative finding which
would not otherwise have been made.
See Builders Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir.
1950).
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where additional evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.2 6 Moreo-
ver, appellate courts review the trial judges' decisions to admit certain
evidence for abuse of discretion. Thus, errors that do not amount to
abuse are not grounds for reversal.2 7 The rise of administrative forms of
adjudication, and the shifting of cases away from traditional courts to
mediation and arbitration, has also softened the impact of the hearsay
rule. 8 In systems that lack these mitigating factors, the American rule
against hearsay may be rigid and disruptive, leading to more appeals and
reversals.
Finally, judges may correct egregious unfairness by ruling that a codi-
fied evidentiary rule yield to constitutional imperatives.29 Constitutional
provisions, such as the Confrontation Clause, impose limits on the admis-
sion and exclusion of hearsay in criminal cases.3" This constitutional
backdrop is a safety net that reduces reliance on the code as a bulwark
against unfairness to criminal defendants.
II. ARE THE HEARSAY PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES AN
APPROPRIATE MODEL FOR NON-JURY SYSTEMS?
Taking away the jury is in itself enough to justify a departure from the
rule against hearsay. Judges, who benefit from expert knowledge of hear-
say evidence, are less likely to allow such evidence to prejudice their
judgments. However, this assumption about judges is, at best, a subsidi-
26 For a catalogue of doctrines that prevent reversal for error in admitting hearsay,
see generally G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth about
Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1993). On harmless error, see id. at 52-55; see also
Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial
Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 473-80 (1992) (noting the effect of doctrines such as
harmless error in reducing judicial supervision, but also noting that the reversal rate
on hearsay grounds is similar to the reversal rate on other grounds); cf Roger C.
Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 647, 648 (1998) (examining a sample
of cases in which hearsay was mentioned as one ground for reversal in about one
percent of all appellate reversals).
27 See Fenner, supra note 26, at 55-57.
28 See Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission,
76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 800 (1992).
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 46 (2004).
30 See id. (reversing on the grounds that the admission of the hearsay statement
under the exception for declarations against interest violated the Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses); see also Bullcoming v. N.M., 131 U.S. 2705 (2011)
(reversing on the grounds that the admission of a laboratory blood alcohol report
under the exception for business records violated the Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses); Chambers v. Miss., 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (reversing on the grounds
that under the facts of the case, the exclusion of evidence, including the exclusion of
hearsay, violated the defendant's constitutional right to present a meaningful
defense).
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ary justification.31 There are four reasons that the rule against hearsay
should not apply in the absence of a jury.
First, the jury system bifurcates trials, making it possible for the presid-
ing judge to exclude hearsay without the trier of fact ever knowing. In
non-bifurcated trials, judges are exposed to hearsay when deciding
whether to exclude it and thus will likely be influenced by it. Where the
excluded hearsay provides independent corroboration of admissible evi-
dence, the hearsay evidence will likely have some probative effect.3 2
Demanding that judges disregard hearsay would often require them to
make a finding of fact that is contrary to what they believe about a case,
which is cognitively and morally difficult even for judges. Therefore, if
judges in bench trials are exposed to admissible and inadmissible hearsay
evidence, the rule against hearsay and its many exceptions no longer
serve to prevent prejudicial decision-making.
Further, in the Federal Rules, the rule against hearsay's rigidity is mod-
erated by the residual exception, which provides for the admissibility of
certain kinds of trustworthy hearsay.3 A broad residual exception to the
hearsay ban is conceivably advantageous in a jury trial if having an exper-
ienced judge preside over the trial improves the jury's decision-making
abilities. However, in bench trials, a rule that provides that hearsay is not
admissible unless it is trustworthy is not necessary because, in any case,
judges will ignore hearsay that they believe to be untrustworthy and rely
on trustworthy hearsay only.
3 4
Second, taking away the jury diminishes the parties' ability to control
the process of proof. The unitary judge necessarily has a stronger influ-
ence on sources of proof. In bench trials, judges are no longer just
umpires who rule on procedural issues while yielding to the jury's
factfinding authority. Judges in bench trials have sole responsibility for
accurate factfinding, which encourages them to interact directly with the
31 For discussion and citation of authority, see generally Schauer, supra note 12.
Schauer himself is skeptical about this position, doubting the superior cognitive
abilities of judges and arguing that hearsay exclusion may encourage the parties to
present better evidence in bench trials as well as in jury trials. Id. at 187.
32 For a convincing example of excluded evidence that would be hard to ignore, see
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Bifurcation and the Law of Evidence, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 134, 136-37 (2007).
33 FED. R. EvID. 807.
31 Of course, a residual exception can have some effect if it has requirements other
than trustworthiness, such as notice. See id. at 885-86. The Federal Rules of Evidence
have a notice requirement that is only sporadically enforced in the federal courts. See
id. at 887-88. The proposed Tanzania Evidence Code allows judges to excuse notice.
Proposed Tanzania Evidence Act, supra note 7, § 9.1; see also Joseph W. Rand, The
Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: A Futile and Misguided Attempt to
Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEO. L.J. 873 (1992).
20151
334 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:327
parties and use their influence to control the production of evidence. 5
This limits the necessity of the hearsay rule, which exists partially to pre-
vent adversaries from using inferior second-hand evidence for strategic
reasons.
36
Third, in trials without a jury, judges are able to produce written find-
ings that summarize the evidence, describe inferences, and justify the
findings of fact that serve as the basis of their decisions.3 7 In contrast, lay
jurors are not asked to write a reasoned explanation of the basis for their
factual findings.3 ' Therefore, judges must control the evidence to which
the jury is exposed in order to increase the legitimacy of the legal pro-
ceedings and prevent findings of fact that are based on prejudicial
evidence.
Finally, without a jury, there is no need for rigid rules designed to limit
judicial discretion and maximize jury power.3 9 As previously explained,
the Advisory Committee designed the residual exception to the rule
against hearsay to allow for the admission of trustworthy hearsay under
certain conditions.4" Additionally, the Federal Rules include three dozen
more specific categorical exceptions to the rule against hearsay.41 With-
out a jury, there is no need to supplement the broad residual exception
with these three dozen complicated categorical exceptions. The categori-
cal exceptions do not limit judges' power to determine whether to receive
35 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Which Evidence Law? A Response to Schauer,
155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 129, 131-32 (2007).
36 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong notes the following:
Consider the hearsay rule's effect of compelling the parties to search for "more
rather than less direct accounts, and to locate and bring forward the most
immediate and cross-examinable witnesses." It is not clear that judges need to be
restricted by a hearsay rule in order to compel the parties in this way. After all,
judges are judges. They can openly demand such evidence from the bench, or
they can just make it clear that, as a matter of policy, they will put much more
weight on direct evidence and cross-examinable witnesses. Lawyers will have to
respond or lose. Hence, it is not clear how much this rationale for a hearsay rule
extends to bench trials.
Id.
37 Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(c). Rule 26.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states the following:
If the party who called the witness claims that the statement contains information
that is privileged or does not relate to the subject matter of the witness's
testimony, the court must inspect the statement in camera. After excising any
privileged or unrelated portions, the court must order delivery of the redacted
statement to the moving party. If the defendant objects to an excision, the court
must preserve the entire statement with the excised portion indicated, under seal,
as part of the record.
Id.
38 See generally id.
39 See FED. R. EviD. 807.
40 See generally id. 801-803.
41 See id. 803.
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hearsay where there is a broad residual exception based on trustworthi-
ness.4" Rather, the categorical exceptions reduce judicial discretion in
jury trials by preventing judges from excluding hearsay. There is no need
to have this safeguard in the absence of a jury trial.
Categorical exceptions that reduce judicial discretion to exclude hear-
say evidence make sense only in the context of a system that values the
role of the jury in the decision-making process. If juries make the impor-
tant findings of fact, jury autonomy must be protected from incursions by
the judge. One way to protect jury autonomy is to curtail judicial discre-
tion in determining whether to exclude certain pieces of hearsay evi-
dence.43 Specific categorical exceptions to the rule against hearsay serve
this purpose: they limit judicial discretion to exclude hearsay.44
Where there is no jury to protect, there is no reason to supplement the
residual exception with categorical exceptions. Although the categorical
exceptions require the judge to "admit" hearsay evidence that falls within
the categories, a judge who believes that the hearsay evidence is untrust-
worthy may admit the evidence and then disregard it.4 5 At most, the cat-
egorical exceptions set forth a nonbinding message encouraging the judge
in a bench trial to consider certain kinds of hearsay as being above the
common run.4 6 The importance of the categorical exceptions as a limit
on arbitrary judicial discretion is vastly reduced in a regime where the
judge is the factfinder"
In short, the rule against hearsay does not make sense in a trial-by-
judge regime. First, the ban cannot be supported on the assumption that
jurors are incompetent to properly weigh the importance of hearsay evi-
dence. Second, excluding hearsay has little effect when the judge and the
factfinder are the same person. Third, because of the influence that
judges exercise during the process of approving evidence, there is less
danger that lawyers will strategically use hearsay evidence to deprive the
factfinder of more valuable evidence. Fourth, because judges may be
required to explain decisions, assessing output is an alternative to trying
to control input.48 Finally, the value of complicated, detailed exceptions
as a check on potential abuse of a judge's discretion is reduced or elimi-






47 See generally id.
48 At best, the message of the hearsay rule might be transformed into what
Damagka calls "continental systems," which typically tell the judge the following
about hearsay evidence: "Use original sources of information whenever they are
reasonably available. When you feel you must rely upon a derivative source, explain
in a written opinion the reasons that impelled you to give credence to information
that is usually of inferior value." DAMAgKA, supra note 8, at 16.
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less need to protect the factfinder from the potential problems that arise
from the admission of hearsay evidence.4 9
III. APPLICATION TO THE PROPOSED TANZANIA EVIDENCE ACT
The drafters of the Proposed TEA acknowledge the merit of a rule that
generally admits hearsay,5" but they opted for a ban-with-exceptions
approach in order to minimize departure from existing evidence law.51
For the foregoing reasons, there is not much difference between the two
approaches in a non-jury system with a broad residual exception. Under
either approach, judges will ignore hearsay that they distrust and rely on
hearsay that they trust. The difference between the two approaches may
depend upon the degree to which the flexible notice requirement of the
residual exception in the Proposed TEA promotes the admissibility of
hearsay evidence.5"
Even if the residual exception is generously applied, the specific excep-
tions can be seen as providing guidelines to judges about especially relia-
ble hearsay. However, when the categorical exceptions fail to restrict
judicial discretion, one must question whether these exceptions serve as
adequate guidelines. An imperfect exception, such as the excited utter-
ance exception, makes more sense when the rigidity of the exception
49 It is true that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not distinguish between bench
trials and jury trials, but other procedural doctrines minimize the influence of the
hearsay rules in bench trials, so it hardly makes any difference. See Proposed Tanzania
Evidence Act, supra note 7.
50 According to the Proposed TEA, "[t]he arguments in favour of general
admissibility are compelling, however, and should be taken into account when
considering the approach to hearsay evidence that the United Republic employs in
the future." Id. at 41.
51 The Proposed TEA notes that "the DC [Drafting Committee] has not
implemented this kind of reform in the Act, which maintains that hearsay evidence is
generally inadmissible except for the enumerated exceptions, as doing otherwise
would represent a substantial departure from the TEA." Id.
52 The residual exception of the proposed Tanzania Evidence Act allows judges to
admit evidence not covered by other exceptions if judges find it to be reliable. Id. at
49-50. Guidance is given in assessing reliability by listing three non-exclusive factors
relating to the motives and perception of the declarant and the likelihood that the
testifying witness accurately perceived the statement. The notice requirement
provides as follows:
Parties that seek to admit evidence under this provision must notify the court and
all opposing parties of their intent to do so before the start of trial. When justice
so requires, a court may admit evidence under this Section where such notice has
not been given. If evidence is admitted without notice, the court shall take such
action as is necessary to avoid undue prejudice to the opposing party.
Id.; cf Civil Evidence Act, 1995, § 2 (U.K.) ("A failure to comply [with the notice
requirement] does not affect the admissibility of the evidence but may be taken into
account by the court ... as a matter adversely affecting the weight to be given to the
evidence.").
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restricts judicial discretion. Otherwise, general guidelines such as the
ones set forth in the British Civil Evidence Act of 1995 may be more
appropriate. 53 General guidelines could caution against reliance on hear-
say evidence that appears to be prepared for litigation in the following
situations: (1) when the declarant could have easily been called to testify;
(2) when the hearsay has multiple levels; (3) when the hearsay is not cor-
roborated; or (4) when there is a danger that one party may have caused
the other party's witness to be unavailable. Reversals could therefore be
based on overreliance on hearsay instead of the erroneous admission of
hearsay.54 Even in the absence of set rules about the sufficiency of evi-
dence, comprehensive judicial review of the reasonableness of factfinding
would ameliorate the effects of a rule that does not categorically control
the admissibility of hearsay.
This Article does not explore the special problems that hearsay evi-
dence poses in criminal cases. In the United States, the Confrontation
Clause provides protection even where rules against hearsay may not.
55
In the absence of a Confrontation Clause equivalent, a ban on certain
types of hearsay would still provide some protection against prejudice
even in the absence of a jury. Rules that require lawyers to call live wit-
nesses could have the beneficial effect of exposing abuse to the public.
Live testimony could be required instead of accusatory out-of-court state-
ments if the declarant is able to testify. The argument for requiring live
testimony is strongest where one party claims that the other coerced a
witness to obtain favorable out-of-court statements.
53 Compare the British guidelines for consideration of hearsay in civil cases. The
guidelines provide that courts should consider: whether it would have been
reasonable for the party using the hearsay to have produced live testimony; whether
the statement was made when memory was fresh; whether the evidence involves
hearsay within hearsay; whether any person involved had a motive to misrepresent;
whether the statement was edited or influenced by another; and whether there is
reason to believe that there was an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of the
weight of the out-of-court statement. See Civil Evidence Act, § 4 (U.K.); see also
ADRIAN KEANE & PAUL McKEOwN, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 352 (10th ed.
2014).
54 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are a possible source of
inspiration. The relevant decisions interpret Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which deals with the right of the accused to examine prosecution
witnesses. See Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the
European Court of Human Rights, 21 Q.L.R. 777 (2003). In AI-Khawaja v. United
Kingdom the Court stated that "where a conviction is based solely or decisively on
the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most
searching scrutiny." 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2011). Applying that scrutiny, the Court
determined that as to one of the defendants, the United Kingdom had breached
Article 6 of the Convention.
55 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 46 (2004).
2015]
338 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:327
IV. IF THE FEDERAL RULES ARE THE MODEL, WHICH VERSION
SHOULD BE USED?
Which version of the Federal Rules would serve as the best model for a
country like Tanzania? The Federal Rules were originally drafted by an
Advisory Committee and then promulgated by the Supreme Court under
its rulemaking authority.5 6 Congress prevented that version of the rules
from entering into force. 57 Congress examined the Advisory Commit-
tee's draft rules before enacting its own evidentiary statutes, which
restricted the use of hearsay.5 8 The Advisory Committee's original ver-
sion dealt with more kinds of hearsay and would thus serve as a better
model, especially in a judicial system where some of the institutional pro-
tections discussed in Part II are missing. The original version included
the following provisions.
A. Prior Statements of Witnesses
The original version of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed prior
inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence.5 9 However,
the current Federal Rules only allow for the admission of prior inconsis-
tent statements as substantive evidence if the statements were made: (1)
subject to the penalty of perjury, and (2) in a judicial proceeding.6" When
the out-of-court declarant testifies as a witness in court, the main concern
of the hearsay rule is mitigated.6 1 The declarant may be cross-examined
about both his or her present testimony and about any prior statements
that he or she may have made.6 2 Thus, it seems only reasonable to allow
the declarant and other witnesses to testify about the declarant's prior
out-of-court statements. If inconsistent statements may be introduced as
56 See generally SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 1.
11 See generally id.
58 See generally id.
59 See Rule 801: Note by Federal Judicial Center, reprinted in ROGER C. PARK &
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1171 (12th ed. 2013).
60 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) allows prior inconsistent statements to be used as
substantive evidence only when the prior statement was made in testimony given
subject to the penalty of perjury in a legal proceeding. Id. Other inconsistent
statements are admissible when used to impeach a witness, on the theory that
statements used for that purpose are not hearsay because they are not being offered
for the truth of the matter asserted. See ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 5.5
(2012). Before Congress changed the rule, it provided that prior inconsistent
statements were generally admissible as substantive evidence. See GLEN
WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 909-11 (6th ed. 2009).
61 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 1.
62 See id.
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substantive evidence, they may be used to support a verdict and not
merely to impeach.
Prior consistent statements should be admissible as substantive evi-
dence for the same reason: judges can examine the consistent statements
and exercise their discretion to exclude frivolous statements. It is worth
noting that a recent amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) (effective Decem-
ber 1, 2014) will broaden the admissibility of these statements in federal
courts.
B. Prior Testimony
The Federal Rules also include a limited exception to the introduction
of former testimony.6" For the exception to apply, the declarant must be
unavailable, the prior testimony must have been subject to cross-exami-
nation, and the cross-examiner must have had a similar motive to cross-
examine as the party against whom the testimony is now being offered. 4
Moreover, in a criminal case, the party against whom the testimony is
offered in the later trial must be the same person as the party who had,
the right to cross-examine in the prior trial.65 In a civil case, the require-
ment is less strict; the exception applies when the party who previously
had the right to cross-examine is either the same person or a "predeces-
sor in interest" of the party against whom the testimony is now being
offered.66 The "same party or predecessor" requirement was added by
Congress; the original rule only required that the prior cross-examiner
have a similar motive.6" The additional requirement was supported on
adversarial grounds.68
It is important to note that having a broad exception for former testi-
mony depends upon many features of local procedure, including whether.
former testimony (e.g., former cross-examination) is reliably recorded.
Competent court reporters and electronic recording devices could be reli-
able sources of former testimony. This Article assumes the feasibility of
producing an accurate account of the former testimony at a later trial.




67 See Rule 804: Note by Federal Judicial Center, reprinted in PARK & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 59, at 1213 (describing how the original rule was changed by Congress).
68 See Rule 804: Report of House Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in PARK &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 1218. The Report stated that the Committee considered
it unfair to "impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being
offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by
another party." Id.
20151
340 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:327
C. Statements by Unavailable Declarants
One of the peculiar features of the American hearsay rule is that it
sometimes excludes statements by declarants who are unavailable to tes-
tify.69 While these statements would often be admissible under specific
hearsay exceptions or under the residual exception, there is no general
exception for statements made by unavailable declarants.
70
This rule of exclusion can only be justified by assuming that the
factfinder is incompetent or that one of the parties in the adversarial pro-
cess is scheming to make one of the declarants unavailable. In other
words, the exception is justified when the factfinder is so incompetent in
evaluating hearsay that it is preferable to keep the factfinder in the dark
than risk exposing the factfinder to the statements made by declarants
whose truthfulness the factfinder will not be able to evaluate properly. It
would thus be better not to hear a statement from a declarant who has
not been cross-examined. Alternately, this rule may be based on the fear
that an adversary may covertly succeed in making a declarant unavailable
in order to prevent his or her testimony (if the scheme were detected, the
hearsay would be admissible on forfeiture grounds). 71 These fears are
less pronounced in a less adversarial system or in a system without trials
by jury.
There are several possible models for creating a broad exception for
statements made by unavailable declarants. For example, one Massachu-
setts hearsay statute (based on the "Thayer rule") allows for the admis-
sion of the declaration of a deceased person in civil cases if the judge
finds that the deceased person made the declaration in good faith and
with personal knowledge.7" The Model Evidence Code would have also
allowed for the admission of hearsay based upon the unavailable declar-
ant's personal knowledge. 73 Neither of these provisions would require a
judicial determination that the out-of-court declarant's statement is trust-
worthy.74 The Massachusetts approach is safer if one fears that adversa-
ries will keep declarants out of court because they believe that, in their
particular cases, hearsay evidence will be more convincing than live testi-
mony from a weak witness.
The original Federal Rules provided a model for statements made by
unavailable declarants. That version had an exception, later eliminated
by Congress, for a statement of recent perception, defined as a
statement, not in response to the instigation of a person investigat-
ing, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or
69 See FED. R. EvID. 804.
70 See id.
71 On forfeiture, see id. 804(b)(6); see also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366
(2008).
72 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 2000).
73 MODEL EVID. CODE 503(a), 18 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 90-134 (1941).
74 Id.
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explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant,
made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated
litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was
clear.75
D. The Residual Exception
The Federal Rules contain a residual exception that allows for the
admission of trustworthy hearsay even if that hearsay evidence does not
fit into a specific exception. 7' The original version of the exception that
the Supreme Court promulgated would have allowed hearsay statements
to be admitted if they contained "circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" that were "comparable" to those of the categorical exceptions.7 7
Congress added additional requirements, principally that the hearsay evi-
dence be "more probative on the point for which it is offered" than other
evidence that could reasonably be obtained, and that pre-trial notice be
given, which includes the particulars of the statement and the name and
address of the declarant.78
The above discussion suggests that a broad trustworthiness-based
residual exception, accompanied by class exceptions, reaches results in
non-jury cases that are broadly similar to the results that would be
reached if the code provided that hearsay was not a basis for objection.
Since I favor the latter result in non-jury civil cases, then of course I like
the idea of having a broad residual exception leading to the same result.
E. Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Cases
As previously mentioned, the Federal Rules were drafted against the
background of constitutional provisions that protect criminal defendants
by placing limits on the admission or exclusion of hearsay in criminal
cases. In jurisdictions that lack similar protections, drafters will need to
accommodate for the protections that the United States provides in the
Constitution.
Consider, for example, the business records exception to the rule
against hearsay. This exception is broad enough to admit the documents
of entities that specialize in the production of evidence for use in criminal
cases, such as crime labs.79 The public records exception could also pro-
vide similar grounds for admission of crime-lab documents."0 However,
construed narrowly, the public records exception may limit the admissi-
bility of law enforcement records.8 1 The Proposed TEA does not incor-
75 See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 6 (1973); H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, at 145 (1973).
76 FED. R. EvID. 807.
77 See generally SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1930-43.
78 See id.
79 See FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
80 See id. 803(8).
81 See id.
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porate those limits. 82 More importantly, the residual exception in the
Proposed TEA could result in the admission of evidence that the trial
judge considers to be trustworthy without giving the defendant the
opportunity to cross-examine declarants who are available and could eas-
ily be called to testify. In American courts, these shortcomings in the
protections of the accused would be offset by the exclusion of hearsay
under the Sixth Amendment's right to confrontation.
8 3
Because protective evidentiary rules would need to be fashioned with
full knowledge of relevant procedural and social issues in Tanzania, it
would be presumptuous of this Article to suggest specific provisions.
However, possible approaches may include rules that limit the use of
accusatory out-of-court statements where declarants could feasibly be
produced for live testimony. A more narrow provision might require that
the accused raise credible evidence of abusive practices, such as coercion
in obtaining statements, as a basis for requiring the testimony of available
declarants.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to make general statements about whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence are an appropriate model for rules concerning hearsay
without an in-depth understanding of a country's judicial and political
system. However, where features of the American system that justify the
exclusion of hearsay are absent, a more permissive approach to the
admission of hearsay is appropriate. In systems that do not have jury
trials, it would be preferable to abolish the hearsay rule and rely upon
other safeguards. Where a jurisdiction seeks to use the Federal Rules as
a model, rulemakers should consider the provisions that allow the selec-
tive use of hearsay evidence, which the Advisory Committee drafted and
the Supreme Court of the United States promulgated, rather than the
more restrictive counterparts that Congress later enacted.
82 See Proposed Tanzania Evidence Act, supra note 7, § 4.3(I).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 46 (2004).
